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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20170815-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DAVID BRYCE JONES,
Defendant/Appellant.
Reply Brief of Appellant
Pursuant to rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant
David Bryce Jones, through counsel, answers the facts and arguments raised in
the Brief of Appellee as follows:
FACTS
A.

The evidence related to David’s mental capacity

The State’s brief suggests that there was evidence David lacked mental
capacity “long before” the charged conduct and that Bryce admitted that he knew
this. See, e.g., Br.Aple. at 31, 59. However, as stated in Bryce’s opening brief, the
evidence was that David had sufficient mental capacity to live independently until
late September 2013, when he a dehydration incident that caused his inability to
live independently. R812-813. Despite the State’s characterization of the facts,
see, e.g., Br.Aple. at 7, 59-60, there was no testimony that David lacked capacity
to execute a power of attorney when he did so in 2010. R806. Although David

started to show early signs of dementia shortly thereafter, there was no evidence
of any medical diagnosis that David was unable to live independently before his
September 2013 dehydration episode. Although David’s brother, Ken, who
visited David only “every other year” or “every third year,” testified that he
noticed David had memory lapses at some point earlier than 2010, he was not
concerned enough about David’s condition to investigate it or take any action.
R600-01.
The State also asserts that David had no interest in the business and that
Bryce took from him intending only to benefit himself, see, e.g., Br.Aple. at 8, 5960, but Bryce testified that his father was a founding member of the LLC, that he
thought he was doing what David wanted, and that he removed David’s name
only to protect him from the lawsuit involving the restaurant lease. R806-08.
Bryce, who is not an expert in dementia or competency, also testified that his
father’s dementia progressed slowly and that although David was still capable of
living independently in March 2013 (when the restaurant lease was signed),
David “had been a couple of years into dementia, and it’s arguable that he was
incompetent at that time.” R808. In addition, friends and business associates
testified that David would visit the restaurant, appeared interested in the project,
and seemed “coherent and lucid” when they saw him at various times in 2013.
See, e.g., R756-57, R768-70, R774-75, R777-78, R784-85.
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B. The difference between incapacity and dementia
Throughout its brief, the State conflates the concepts of capacity with
dementia. For example, the State uses David’s “progressive dementia” on the
Highland Cove admission form as evidence that he lacked capacity at that time.
Br.Aple. 32. But simply having dementia does not render one legally
incompetent. Dementia includes a broad category of diseases that cause memory
loss and deterioration of other brain functions. It is a progressive disease that in
some individuals slowly progresses over a period of years, starting with mild
cognitive impairment. See, e.g., Markus MacGill, Dementia: Symptoms, Stages,
and types, Medical News Today (Dec. 1, 2017),
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/142214.php; Lauren Reed-Guy,
The Stages of Dementia, Healthine.com (June 27, 2016),
https://www.healthline.com/health/dementia/stages.
“Incapacity,” on the other hand, is a legal definition that focuses on an
individual’s actual ability to function at a given point in time. For example,
“incapacity” is defined by the Utah Uniform Probate Code as “measured by
functional limitations and means a judicial determination after proof by clear and
convincing evidence that an adult’s ability to do the following is impaired to the
extent that the individual lacks the ability, even with appropriate technological
assistance, to meet the essential requirements for financial protection or physical
health, safety, or self-care: (a) receive and evaluate information; (b) make and
communicate decisions; or (c) provide for necessities such as food, shelter,
-3-

clothing, health care, or safety.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201. For purposes of the
Utah Uniform Power of Attorney Act, “incapacity” is defined as “the inability of
an individual to manage property or business affairs because the individual:
(a) has an impairment in the ability to receive and evaluate information or make
or communicate decisions even with the use of technological assistance; or (b) is:
(i) missing; (ii) detained, including incarcerated in a penal system; or (iii) outside
the United States and unable to return.” Utah Code Ann. § 75-9-102(5).
Because the legal definitions focus on an individual’s ability, it is likely that
a person with mild cognitive impairment could be deemed legally competent. Or,
a person could be competent in some contexts but not others, for example a
person may lack capacity to manage property as defined by law but still have
capacity to live independently. And, given that capacity can change on a day-today basis, even a person with moderate or advanced dementia could still be
deemed competent under Utah law depending on the circumstances.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Improper Evidence was Prejudicial.

As stated in Bryce’s opening brief, prejudice requires showing only that
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome … consider[ing]
the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1986). Rather than focus on this standard, the State appears
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to argue–without supporting authority—that because of the strong evidence that
David suffered from dementia, no amount of inadmissible evidence could have
created a reasonable probability of a different outcome in Bryce’s trial. See
Br.Aplt. 31-33. But this ignores that not only was suffering from dementia (or the
resulting incapacity) not an element of any charged crime, it also ignores that
much of the inadmissible evidence was admitted for no other purpose than to
bolster the State’s case against Bryce or to assert that he had a bad character.
The State therefore has not shown that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
outcome of the proceeding would be different absent counsel’s deficient
performance. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671.
Likewise, the State’s assertion that Bryce is trying “to change” the deficient
performance standard lacks merit. Br.Aple. at 25 n.3. It is hard to conceive how
any defendant would ever meet Strickland’s requirement to “overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy” without arguing that counsel’s trial strategy was
unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S., 668, 689 (198 (quotation marks and
citation omitted); accord State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ¶ 22, 321 P.3d 1136
(rejecting State’s argument that no objecting to obviously improper,
inflammatory and prejudicial statement was “sound” trial strategy).
A. Inadmissible expert testimony.
The State asserts that Bryce cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel
because an objection to the improper expert testimony would have been futile,
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and that he cannot show prejudice because it was merely cumulative and because
at best Bryce could have obtained a continuance. Br.Aple. at 28-33. However, in
arguing that it would have been futile to object to improper expert testimony, the
State does not argue that the Mack and Tower testimony were reasonably based
on the witnesses’ perceptions, as required by Rules 602 and 701, Utah Rules of
Evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter.”); Id. R. 701 (lay witness opinion testimony
must be “rationally based on the witness’s perception”). Rather, the State’s
argument appears to be that because Tower and Mack observed David at some
point in time, they should be able to provide lay witness testimony as to his
ability to comprehend financial documents at any point in time. Br.Aple. at 25
and 28-29. There is simply no basis in the law to support this assertion.
The State first argues that even though Tower was asked to opine “based on
his psychiatry degree,”1 that testimony should not be considered expert testimony
because it was also based on observations. Br.Aple. at 26 & n.4. The State also
appears to argue that his testimony could have been lay testimony because “[a]n
average bystander … could opine” that David “would have difficulty
comprehending a complex financial document.” Br.Aple. at 27.

1

Tower’s degree was actually in psychology.
-6-

However, the State’s argument ignores that even if this testimony could
have been within a lay person’s purview, Tower was asked to use his specialized
knowledge to testify as to whether David “could read this document and
comprehend it.” R539. “[I]f testimony, ‘opinion or otherwise,’ is based on
‘scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,’ it is within the scope of rule
702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and may not be admitted as lay fact
testimony.” Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 20, 147 P.3d 1176. Thus, an objection
to expert testimony by a lay witness would not have been futile.
The same is true for Mack. The State concedes that Mack had no personal
knowledge of David’s capacity at the time either document was signed. Br.Aple.
at 28 & n.5. However, the State suggests that this Court should overlook that lack
of personal knowledge because “it was already clear that David lacked capacity to
sign.” Br.Aple. at 28 & n. 5. If that were the case, the State should have called a
witness who actually observed David at the time he signed. Indeed, contrary to
the State’s position that David’s mental capacity “would only have been worse”
after Mack observed him, Br.Aple. at 28 & n.3, even an individual “in the later
stages … may experience moments of lucidity (being aware of their situation) and
some of their abilities return temporarily.” See The Later Stages of Dementia, 3,
Alzhemier’s Society (Reviewed May 2017 by Dr. Jacqueline Crowther and
Catharine Jenkins),
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/factsheet_the_later_stag
es_of_dementia.pdf; see also Carol Bradley Bursack, Surprising and Gratifying
-7-

Moments in Caregiving: People with Dementia can have Moments of Clarity,
ElderCarelink, http://www.eldercarelink.com/Alzheimers-andDementia/surprising-and-gratifying-moments-in-caregiving-people-withdementia-can-have-moments-of-clarity.htm. In short the State has not shown
that it was objectively reasonable to not object to the lay witness testimony that
was not “rationally based on the witness’s perception.” Thus, failing to object to
the lay witness testimony on the grounds that testimony was not “rationally
based on the witness’s perception” was objectively unreasonable. See Utah R.
Evid. 701.
As for prejudice, the State argues that there was none because the best
Bryce could have hoped for by objecting to Mack’s and Tower’s expert testimony
was a continuance and that there is no reasonable likelihood that a continuance
would have helped. Br.Aple. at 30. This argument is supported solely by a
citation to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3, which allows for a continuance or exclusion
of expert testimony on a showing of “bad faith.” Even if the State’s argument had
merit, given the “‘difficult burden placed on defendants to establish prejudice in
cases such as these,’ the burden is on the State to persuade the court there is no
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome would have been more
favorable to the defendant.” State v. Peraza, 2018 UT App 68, ¶ 44, 427 P.3d 276
(review of denial of motion for continuance). Here, had the State given proper
notice that it would call three experts rather than one, counsel could have better
prepared for that testimony and had time to make arguments for its exclusion.
-8-

Moreover, the State’s argument presupposes that both Mack and Tower
would have easily qualified as experts and that no bad faith in disclosing the
witnesses only as fact witnesses would have been found. Finally, if as the State
suggests, the testimony was merely cumulative of the State’s expert testimony,
then the trial court may well have excluded it as cumulative of the State’s other
expert testimony, particularly where it was used merely to improperly bolster
that testimony. needlessly … cumulativeSee Utah R. Evid. 403 (allowing
exclusion of “needlessly … cumulative” evidence); State ex rel. A.M.D., 2006 UT
App 457, ¶ 20, 153 P.3d 724 (opinion testimony properly excluded where another
expert testified to the same issue).
Thus, for the above reasons and as stated in Bryce’s opening brief, trial
counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the improper expert testimony.
B. Inadmissible other acts evidence.
The State argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the prior loan and
lease evidence did not prejudice Bryce. With regard to the prior loan evidence,
the State argues that the prior loan evidence was not prejudicial because it was
subject to more than one interpretation. Br.Aple. at 35. And the State argues that
evidence that Bryce has a propensity to take out loans from his father and not pay
them back could not prejudice him because “this case is not about unpaid loans.”
Br.Aple. at 35. This is a misleading statement because the conduct that Bryce was
charged with was taking out (allegedly unauthorized) loans from his father and
not paying him back, and the State repeatedly referred to this at trial. See, e.g., R
-9-

852 (State questioning Bryce “You also discharged any and all loans that you had
to your father in bankruptcy, correct?”). Indeed, “admitting evidence under rule
404(b) can often be problematic because of the ‘dual inferences’ that evidence of
prior acts can yield.” State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 14, 328 P.3d at 850 (quoting
State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ¶ 16, 296 P.3d 673), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. “The language of the rule is
inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, meaning that evidence may be admitted
despite its negative propensity inference, but ‘[i]f such evidence is really aimed at
establishing a defendant's propensity to commit crime, it should be excluded
despite a proffered (but unpersuasive) legitimate purpose.’” Lucero, 2014 UT 60,
¶ 14 (footnote and citations omitted). “In other words, the evidence ‘must have
real probative value, not just possible worth.’” Lucero, 2014 UT 60, ¶ 14 (quoting
United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985)). Thus, although
the prior loan evidence may not be evidence of other acts in all cases, in the
context of this case, as the State concedes, the evidence “strongly implied” that
Bryce had a propensity to take out loans from his father and not repay them. Cf.
State v. Hood, 2018 UT App 236, ¶ 22 (“[I]n the unique context of this case,
evidence of excommunication strongly implied that Hood had committed an act
relevant to his propensity to commit the crimes for which he was on trial.”).
With regard to the lease evidence, the State asserts that the lease
agreement was not 404(b) evidence at all because it was “only Jones’s later, incourt representation that he knew his father was “not competent” at the time he
-10-

signed the Brewhaha lease” that constituted another act. Br. Aple. At 37. But
Bryce’s argument is not that his statement that it was “arguable that [David] was
incompetent” constitutes an other act, it is that the State’s presentation of
evidence that Bryce had previously gotten his father to sign a lease while he was
incompetent constituted an other act, which was highly prejudicial particularly
where the State used that evidence in closing to argue that Bryce was dishonest
and had a history of acting against his father’s best interest. Br.Aplt at 26-28.
Finally, to the extent the State argues that no amount of other acts evidence
could have prejudiced Bryce because of the overwhelming evidence against him,
this argument lacks merit. It is akin to the civil “libel-proof plaintiff” doctrine,2
which has no bearing in the criminal context because such a theory would
amount to strict liability based solely on a showing of strong evidence by the State
on one element of a charged crime. Indeed, the danger of being convicted based
on bad character rather than an assessment of the evidence of the crime can
undermine confidence in the verdict. See Rackham, 2016 UT App 167, ¶ 24, 381
P.3d 864. It also undermines the “time-honored tenet” of barring character
evidence. Daniel Capra and Liesa L. Richter, Character Assassination:
Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(B) to Protect Criminal Defendants, 118
Colum. L. Rev. 769, 771 (2018). “The American adversary system was designed to

See, e.g., Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2004) (“An individual
who engages in certain anti-social or criminal behavior and suffers a diminished
reputation may be 'libel proof' as a matter of law, as it relates to that specific
behavior.”).
2
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convict defendants based upon their conduct and not based on their general
character or past misdeeds. Rule 404(b) was designed to further this purpose as a
rule of exclusion, prohibiting evidence of uncharged acts offered to prove a
person’s character (most often the criminal defendant’s character) in order to
demonstrate his or her conduct on the occasion in question.” Id. .
The other acts evidence was therefore prejudicial and as explained in
Bryce’s opening brief, trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to its
admission—particularly given the trial court’s pretrial ruling.
C.

The Improper Elements Instruction.

The State does not argue that the unlawful dealing by a fiduciary charge
requires only a reckless mental state for the substantial risk of loss element.
Br.Aplt. 41. Instead the State asserts that counsel cannot be ineffective for not
objecting to the elements instruction because there is no clear case law on point
and asserts that Bryce relied only on persuasive authority. Br.Aplt.41. However,
as stated in Bryce’s opening brief, trial counsel was objectively unreasonable for
not objecting to the instruction based on the plain language of the statute—in
context with other Utah statutes–and rules of statutory construction, along with
persuasive authority that supports that reading. See, e.g., State v. Apodaca, 2018
UT App 131, ¶ 76, 428 P.3d 99, 119, cert. granted, 432 P.3d 1231 (Dec. 8,
2018)(stipulating to instruction that “effectively lowered the State's burden of
proof” as to mens rea “cannot be considered reasonable trial strategy”).
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Moreover, the State’s argument that because the jury found that Jones
acted knowingly or intentionally with regard to exploitation of a vulnerable adult
means that he must have known that his actions involved a substantial risk of loss
defies logic. Br.Aple. at 42. The State cites no authority to support this
argument. Indeed it would require a substantial logical leap to presume that
knowingly using resources for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable
adult is the same as knowing that such use would cause a substantial risk of loss.
Thus, as stated in Bryce’s opening brief, trial counsel was ineffective for
stipulating to the elements instruction.
II.

Bryce has not waived any argument related to merger

The State argues that Bryce has partially waived his statutory and
constitutional merger argument by arguing that Bryce’s two convictions should
be merged in the same way as a lesser included offense because the State asserted
just one criminal act. Br.Aple. at 42-45 (citing State v. Corona, 2018 UT App
154). Bryce has not waived any such argument. His opening brief stated that
merger should apply because Bryce was convicted of two crimes but the State
asserted no evidence that could result in a conviction of one crime but not the
other. See Br. Aplt. 48-51. (quoting State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 245 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (merger appropriate where the State’s did not argue or prove an
independent factual basis for separate crimes); and distinguishing State v. Yanez,
2002 UT App 50, ¶ 21, 42 P.3d 1248 (no merger where there was independent
evidence to support each conviction)). In support, Bryce cited Utah Const. art. I §
-13-

12, which provides “nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.” He also cited Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (“[W]hen the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision.”). And he quoted State v. Sanchez,
2015 UT App 27, ¶ 8, 344 P.3d 191, which articulated that merger avoids “a
circumstance where a ‘criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct
that amounts to only one offense.’” See Br.Aplt. 48.3
The State does not dispute that there was no independent evidence
presented to support Bryce’s convictions for unlawful dealing by a fiduciary and
abuse, neglect or exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Instead, the State asserts
that because it is possible to commit each crime without committing the other,
they are not lesser-included offenses and the merger doctrine should not apply.
Br. Aple. at 45. The State’s argument is not persuasive because it conflates the
merger doctrine with the Shondel doctrine. See State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146
(Utah 1969). The Shondel doctrine entitles a defendant to the lesser punishment
“when two statutes are ‘wholly duplicative as to the elements of each crime.’”
State v. Melancon, 2014 UT App 260, ¶ 25, 339 P.3d 151 (quoting State v. Bryan,

Indeed, given that Bryce’s brief was filed shortly after the longstanding
Finlayson test was overruled, there is no clear standard to brief on the issue. See
State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶ 37, 420 P.3d 1064 (“We recognize that our
disposition of this issue, as well as today's opinion writ large, leaves several
questions unanswered, including the meaning of the ‘same act’ language of the
statutory merger test.”).
3
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709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985)). Unlike the Shondel doctrine, the “merger
doctrine derives from the constitutional guarantee that a person may not be held
accountable twice for the same criminal conduct.” State v. Williams, 2007 UT
98, ¶ 13, 175 P.3d 1029 (quoting State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶ 63, 174 P.3d
628; U.S. Const. amend. V).
In other words, when as here, the State alleges and presents evidence to
support a conviction for just one criminal act, punishing Bryce twice would
violate Bryce’s statutory and constitutional protections against multiple
punishments for the same offense under either Utah Code Section 76-1-402(1) or
(3). See, e.g., State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, ¶ 33, 317 P.3d 433 (The rule
against multiplicity stems ‘from the 5th Amendment [Double Jeopardy Clause],
which prohibits the Government from charging a single offense in several counts
and is intended to prevent multiple punishments for the same act.’”) (quoting
State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶ 24, 31 P.3d 547). “Utah Code section 76-1402 codifies the ‘judicially-crafted’ merger doctrine that ‘protects criminal
defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that may
violate more than one criminal statute.’” State v. Perez-Avila, 2006 UT App 71, ¶
10, 131 P.3d 864 (quoting State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 615
(ineffective assistance for not seeking to merge DUI and automobile homicide
charges).
In any event, the State has not shown that there is no overlap sufficient for
merger as a lesser-included offense. As outlined in Bryce’s opening brief, the
-15-

abuse of a vulnerable adult offense required the State to prove Bryce “unjustly or
improperly uses or manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or
advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5111(4)(a)(ii). With vulnerable adult being defined as “an elder adult,” i.e. “a
person 65 years of age or older” or an adult with diminished capacity. See id. §
76-5-111(1)(f), (s). Unlawful dealing by a fiduciary required showing that Bryce
“deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary … in a manner
which the person knows is a violation of the person’s duty and which involved a
substantial risk of loss or detriment to the owner.” Id. § 76-6-513(2). The State’s
argument that there is never sufficient overlap when a person is charged with a
single act that amounts abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a vulnerable adult if that
person is a fiduciary.
Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion, arguing for merger under the facts
of this case would not have been futile. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 2016 UT App 157, ¶
23, 380 P.3d 11 (not seeking merger was ineffective assistance of counsel,
regardless of theory applied, where defendant was convicted of two counts of
aggravated robbery, but was convicted of two). It was objectively unreasonable
and prejudicial for trial counsel to not assert a merger argument because Bryce
was charged with just one criminal act yet was twice convicted and sentenced. As
stated in Bryce’s opening brief, this is a violation of his statutory and
constitutional rights and his trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing for
merger.
-16-

III.

Bryce has standing to challenge the exploitation
statute.

The State argues that Bryce lacks standing to challenge the exploitation of a
vulnerable adult statute because according to the State, Bryce’s conduct “is
clearly prohibited.” Br.Aple at 47. However, as stated in his opening brief, Bryce
acted thinking he was following his father’s wishes and had no notice as to what
conduct was “unjust” or “improper.” Br.Aplt. at 4-5, 44-45. In making this
argument it further asserts that “unjust” and “improper” should be read to mean
“without proper consent or authorization.” Br.Aple. at 49-50. However, this
reading of the statute ignores that the provision under which Bryce was charged
includes no reference to consent (although subsections (ii) and (v) reference
“lacks the capacity to consent”). If the legislature had intended to use the phrase
“without the proper consent or authorization” in subsection (iii) under which
Bryce was charged, it could have. But it did not and the State’s suggestion that
the Court should write in its proposed definition ignores the plain language and
the dictionary definition of those terms. See, e.g., Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 11,
162 P.3d 1099 (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 34, 52 P.3d 1210) (“Looking
to the plain language of the statute, ‘we assume that each term in the statute was
used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading
is unreasonably confused or inoperable.’”). And the exploitation statute, while
replete with definitions, does not define unjust or improper, which only adds to
the lack of notice.
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In addition, the State’s attempt to read requirements into the statute that
are not there make its efforts to distinguish the cases cited in Bryce’s opening
brief less persuasive. For example, the State argues that because Utah’s statute
does not have “with or without consent” language, the Mississippi statute is
inopposite. Br.Aple. at 53. Yet, Utah’s statute also does not require the elder
adult’s consent. It merely requires that the person “unjustly or improperly uses or
manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the profit or advantage of
someone other than the vulnerable adult.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111(4)(a)(iii).
The State also argues that “no ordinary person would think it unjust or
improper … for a child to ask a vulnerable parent for help paying college tuition
or buying a home.” Br.Aple. at 51. But the State fails to explain how asking a
vulnerable adult parent for money for buying a home or attending college is
substantially different from asking for money to start a business, particularly
where if successful, the business would benefit the parent. Br.Aple. at 51-52.
Instead the State suggests that doing so would only be unjust if the child knew
that the “vulnerable parent lacked capacity to consent.” Id. But, as explained in
Bryce’s opening brief, capacity to consent is not an element under subsection (iii).
The State further suggests that the vagueness is mitigated because “Jones had to
at least know that his father was a vulnerable adult” and that “his actions were
unjust or improper.” Br.Aple. at 52. But, as stated, the exploitation statute
defines anyone age 65 or older as a vulnerable adult. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111
(f), (s) (defining “vulnerable adult” as an “elder adult” and “elder adult as
-18-

someone 65 years old or older). Thus, anyone who knows their parent is elderly
could potentially face criminal liability if a jury subjectively determines that the
use of the funds is unjust or improper.4
Thus, as stated in Bryce’s opening brief, the statute is unconstitutionally
vague, as applied to him.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and as stated in the Brief of Appellant, Bryce
respectfully requests that his convictions be reversed and the charges against him
dismissed with prejudice, that the Court reverse his convictions and remand for a
new trial, or that the Court remand with an order to merge his convictions.
DATED this 20th day of March 2019.

/s/ Deborah L. Bulkeley
Counsel for Appellant

The State asserts that Bryce “clearly” violated other code sections, but he was
not charged under those code sections and no jury found him guilty under those
code sections. It is unclear whether the State is arguing that Bryce must
challenge the entire statute, or whether this Court should affirm even if the
provision is vague because Bryce must be guilty of something. However, neither
theory is supported by any authority and the Court should disregard this
argument by the State. Br.Aple. at 48 n.11.
4
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